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events in London. 4 'For you could see heaps of dead bodies and corpses lying in the squares and other places', wrote the Monk of Westminster. 'And so they spent the day, thinking only of the massacre of the Flemings.' 5 Modern historians of 1381 have thought (or at any rate written) about it somewhat less avidly. In an authoritative collection of essays on the rising, published in 1984, the attack on the Flemings earns precisely one sentence. 6 Liberal academic distaste doubtless plays a part, in that the socially-progressive elements in fourteenth-century English life are scarcely expected to be caught indulging in acts of ethnic cleansing. When they do, their actions appear, in the words of Steven Justice, 'the most disreputable of the rebellion'. 7 The slaughter of the Flemings has also perhaps seemed to modern eyes beyond the pale in a more fundamental way: it does not fit easily into accustomed frameworks for understanding premodern social disorder. Butchering home-grown lawyers and bureaucrats appears natural and explicable enough; killing foreign merchants and artisans another matter entirely. That, at
least, is what must be concluded from the rather baffled tone in which those historians who have considered the incident tend to refer to it. 8 Medieval reporters are not, it is true, much more forthcoming as to why the massacre happened. The explanation in their case, however, probably lies less with modern-style incomprehension than its opposite: an assumption that the slaughter of aliens did not need much explaining, but was self-evidently what was likely to occur when 'the commons of England' -or their counterparts in other realms -were allowed to have their will. 9 In the febrile political climate of the late medieval town, attacks on groups of privileged and unpopular foreigners were a more frequent occurrence than the fragmentary and scattered scholarly literature on the subject might lead readers initially to suppose.
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Tales of inter-ethnic bloodshed were woven into the basic stuff of medieval thought and assumption to a degree which modern scholarship has been apt to overlook. For just that reason they need to be handled with caution, since they were the kind of tales which grew in the telling, fitting themselves to established patterns, projecting clear-cut ethnic purges onto outbreaks of violence which must often have been both more limited in scope and more complex in character. 11 In the case of the 'Flemings', the language test which supposedly sealed their fate -the most distinctively ethnic element in accounts of their destruction -is mentioned by just a single, late chronicler. 12 The motif of unpopular outsiders being unmasked and killed after stumbling over tricky native words is encountered repeatedly in historical writings from various corners of medieval Europe. 13 Often, the words themselves -'bread and cheese' or, in Bruges in 1302, 'shield and friend' -seem deliberately to evoke precisely the sorts of taken-for-granted solidarities or everyday domestic artefacts which distinguish the natural and known from the artificial and foreign. 14 They are 'us' words. When a revolt among the Germans of Kraków was suppressed in 1312, it is reported that all lost their lives who could not pronounce the Polish names for several comparably homely objects:
lentil, wheel, mill. Again, the source is of a later date. 15 The biblical precedent, in the Book of Judges, of the Gileadites forcing the Ephraimites to say 'shibboleth', comes to mind, and was probably in the minds of medieval historiographers too. 16 It is likely, then, that at least some such accounts were inspired less by the reputed course of events than by the authoritative, ancient prototypes which were available for recounting acts of inter-ethnic slaughter such as was assumed must have taken place. completely or to drive them into the sea, so that the Britannic name should never more be mentioned'. 27 In England, in the thirteenth century, supporters of Simon de Montfort suggested that the foreigners around the king intended 'to blot out the name of the English'. 28 Things appear hardly less perilous at Latin Europe's opposite extremity. According to a Polish chronicle from the fourteenth century, Germans close to the princes of Glogów had urged them to exterminate the entire Polish people, especially its spiritual and secular elites. 29 In 1307 the bishop of Kraków, to his enemies another German partisan, was accused by one of his clergy of having stated that, were he to fail in his aim of eliminating the Polish people, he would rather die than live. 30 In annals from the same city, meanwhile, it was claimed that the Teutonic Knights had in mind to 'exterminate the Polish language'. 31 This was around the time that Edward I of England was informing his subjects that his French enemies proposed to wipe out the English language. 32 The charge was to be repeated nearly two hundred years later by Edward IV, who accused his Lancastrian enemies of joining with the French, the Scots, and other foreign foes 'to destroye uttarly the people, the name, the tonge and all the bloud englyshe of this owr sayd Realme'.
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Exterminare, eliminare: the terminology seems starkly unambiguous. Remarks such as these are not especially rare or anomalous in medieval writings and it would be easy to add to them.
Taken at face value, they seem to attest patterns of thought which not only understood political organisation in fundamentally ethnic terms, but which viewed political strife as a process of inter-ethnic competition, in which only the fittest survived, with the annihilation of entire peoples the price of defeat. Matters are not, however, quite so clear-cut. As Rees Davies showed, in his magisterial studies of the peoples of medieval Britain, the language of ethnic destruction could in fact bear meanings more complex than may appear at first sight. 34 A people might be undone in other ways than by slaughter or expulsion. Henry of Huntingdon's famous verdict on the Norman Conquest was that God had dealt the English their just deserts, commanding that they should no longer exist as a people. 35 Loss, not of life or homeland, but of power and independence therefore lay at the heart of this act of divinely-sanctioned extermination. A comparable way of thinking underlies the claim, enunciated in a short political tract from the mid-fourteenth century, that a Plantagenet succession to the Scottish throne must result in the 'destruction, eradication and total extermination' of the Scottish people. 36 Nations or peoples were conceived in the Middle Ages as quintessentially political communities; changes in the political landscape thus threatened automatically to affect the standing, indeed the very existence, of imagined ethnic groups. 37 Even adjustments to the administrative geography of the Catholic Church might, when combined with more extensive social and political movements, invoke for some the shadow of ethnic obliteration. Jakub Świnka, metropolitan of the Polish see of Gniezno, drew up in January 1285 a vehement protest addressed to several Roman cardinals, denouncing recent alterations to the provincial boundaries of the Franciscan order in the east, which had seen most of Silesia incorporated into the order's Saxon province. 38 Viewed in light of the contemporary influx of German-speaking settlers into western Poland (the broader consequences of which Świnka likewise condemned), terminological shifts might, as he insisted, foreshadow and sanction larger, more sinister transformations. Unless such novelties were annulled, therefore, and 'the land of Poland, … be regarded, as before, as Poland and not
Saxony', 'we will be forced to lament with trembling voices the extermination of our people as well as the evident peril of our churches'. 39 Names, language, laws and customs; these were elements which, for medieval observers, constituted the unity of the political and the ethnic community: the obliteration of any one of them as a result of political or even adminstrative change might thus constitute in itself a form of genocide.
Some characteristic patterns of assumption and argument are revealed in a manifesto issued in 1324 in the name of the Ludwig IV, the German ruler of the western Roman Empire. 40 Pope John XXII had declared Ludwig excommunicate and his election null and void, and had laid claim to administer the Empire's lands during its vacancy. The pope, fulminated Ludwig, was a malicious subvertor of canons and a violator of rights and customs, who intended totally to exterminate the holy Empire, its liberty and dignity, and also to exterminate and nullify the prince-electors of the Empire, all the Empire's subjects, and all of Germany. 41 The language, once again, is that of absolute destruction. But the writer's concerns are all with rights, status, and dignity: those of the Empire, its ruler and princes; and those, more broadly, of the German people, as the Empire's rightful custodians.
Common political identities in the Middle Ages were defined in ways that were both legalistic and comparative: their essence was expressible in terms of concrete privileges and entitlements; and they were conceived and measured in relation to the rights and titles of other peoples. Privilege was the reflection and consequence of a people's fame -its reputacioun, as the poet John Lydgate put it. 42 'I am born of the famous name of Britons', declared a Welshman in the eleventh century. 43 The 'famous chivalry of Englishmen' was taken by
Lydgate as a subject for celebration. 44 'It is not without reason that this nation [the French] grew famous above other nations', insisted the Grandes Chroniques. 45 Collective privileges, it was firmly believed, had been earned, through illustrious common deeds in times past. They needed constantly to be vindicated anew through further conspicuous acts, and defended, by watching with a jealous eye for slights and infringements. Peoples, just like great families, subsisted within a public economy of honour and title; and, like great families, they too might be 'ruined' by allowing themselves to be shamed, and stripped or robbed of their dignities.
The 'name and nobility' of the Welsh, according to one fourteenth-century writer, had been destroyed by the English. 46 The German people had its own collective patent of nobility in its claim to the Roman Empire, made manifest in the power of election exercised by its princes. 47 To forfeit these titles, or to permit an unjust pope publicly to trample on them, was to court oblivion.
The fact that medieval observers did not always have physical slaugher in mind when they wrote of the destruction of peoples does not mean that they did not regard the prospect as a terrible one. Titles mattered, and their loss had grave material consequences. Of course, Ludwig's manifesto did not at all mean to suggest that John XXII was seeking the physical annihilation of the Empire's German subjects. Nevertheless, the same document insisted, the pope did have innocent blood on his hands, since the divisions which he had deliberately sown in Germany created conditions of anarchy in which many were dying. 48 To strip a people of its identity, in the form of its rights and liberties, was to render it incapable of its own defence, and thus expose it to the gravest of perils. The spectre of mass bloodshed, shut out at one door, thus re-enters by another. This way of thinking can be approached a little more closely in an observation made by the Bernese chronicler Konrad Justinger, who told how in the fourteenth century the town of Bern had been menaced by its greedy aristocratic neighbours. Their goal, he explained, was to possess the town in perpetuity, killing all the inhabitants, men and women, young and old. 49 A town, just like a people, was conceivable as a community of a shared identity, rooted in law and privilege. To forfeit these was to stand helpless before an implacably hostile world. From disenfranchisement, and loss of common identity, to physical annihilation, Justinger's remark implies, was but a short step.
An extreme illustration of the peril to which peoples lacking legal rights might find themselves exposed is seen in the call which Bernard of Clairvaux issued in March 1147, for a crusade against the pagan Slavs of the southern Baltic. 50 Adopting the language of ethnicity which was traditional when referring to heathens, he called on the crusaders to 'take vengeance on the (pagan) peoples -nationes -and exterminate them from the land of our
Christian name'. They should take up the cross, he urged, 'in order either completely to destroy those nationes or definitively convert them'. There should be no peace 'until, with Bernard's call to arms has been a source of controversy among historians, not all of whom have wanted to accept that he really did have in mind the physical obliteration -the killing or expulsion -of recalcitrant Slavs. 52 But that, surely, remains the most plausible reading of his words. They therefore suggest that while medieval notions of genocide were not confined to those acts of mass slaughter and eviction which we associate with modernity, such deeds were nevertheless quite thinkable, and might even be urged on occasion as desirable.
So readily thinkable were they, in fact, that subsequent generations in some quarters came firmly to believe that they had actually taken place. What above all else fitted
Charlemagne for emperorship was, for one German town chronicler, that he had 'forcibly converted the heathens in many parts [of the world] to the Christian faith or had expelled them from Christian lands'. 53 Later medieval commentators had none of the modern scholar's scruples about interpreting as ethnic destruction the religious purges of times past. A Hussite manifesto of 1420 warned its Czech audience that 'just as they [i.e., the Germans] did to our tongue on the Rhine, in Misnia, in Prussia, and drove it out, the same they intend to do to us and to occupy the places of the banished'. 54 Out of a hazy recollection of the contests between
Christian and pagan in the northern Europe of the central Middle Ages -and the accompanying advance of German settlement across the region -the compiler(s) had conjured a lurid panorama of epic sweep, taking the form of a series of interconnected historic struggles for ethnic survival. That the Czechs' 'Slav' cousins had, as the manifesto told it, been in every case the losers, and endured the dispossession which inevitably followed, was meant to be understood as both a terrible warning and an urgent call to arms. 55 With even
Bernard's religious underpinnings stripped away, the mythologised historical vision with which its audience was presented was bleak indeed: a bitter and unremitting inter-ethnic fight to the death.
Nor should the opportunities be minimised which could arise in medieval Europe for ethnic groups actually to be targeted for attack. Massacres, and the deliberate terrorising of whole populations, were not uncommon, particularly in time of war. The German king
William of Holland (1247-56) dated a document drawn up during a military campaign with the words, 'in camp while depopulating West Frisia'. 56 In such a climate, violence could quickly take on an ethnic colouring. Language differences, for example, were more than just a learned topos for explaining and simplifying acts of bloodshed. They were a real source of distinctions, which could on occasion have grave consequences. When a chronicler claims that William Wallace, on his raids into the north of England, spared no-one who spoke the English language, the reader is surely right to be sceptical. 57 But other reports in similar vein are less easily dismissed. In 1421, Nuremberg's councilmen wrote to the town of Ulm, recounting the deeds of a German crusading army which had been sent against the Bohemian Hussites. 'The common soldiery', they reported, were 'running wild'. 'Anyone who cannot speak German, or who appears to be Czech, is taken captive, beaten to death and burnt, because the men are out of control, since the army is so great and mighty.' 58 Viewed in light of a sober, matter-of-fact statement such as this, the unreflective readiness with which some medieval writers were able to envisage acts of ethnic slaughter becomes a little easier to understand.
More fundamentally, however, when they turned their minds to the destruction of peoples, they were able to draw upon an inheritance of knowledge and assumption which assured them that such acts of mass slaughter had occurred before -assured them, indeed, that it was inevitable and proper that from time to time they should occur. Within the Judeo-Christian history of salvation, the obliteration and replacement of peoples was a principal motor of advance and historical change:
And at that time came Joshua, and cut off the Anakims from the mountains, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the mountains of Judah, and from the mountains of Israel: Joshua destroyed them utterly with their cities. There were none of the Anakims left in the land of the children of Israel. 59 Biblical history was ethnic history. Those peoples which did not enjoy divine favour were fated to be destroyed, and their destruction was characteristically a violent one. 60 From the very start, in Eden, God's wrath found expression as eviction and purge. 'Let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech', God says of the builders of the Tower of Babel. 'So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth.' 61 The creation and the destiny of peoples were inseparable from acts of mass devastation and banishment.
Such messages were not lost upon western Europeans in the Middle Ages, whose own pagan traditions had likewise been capable of envisaging scenes of cataclysmic destruction.
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A people's status and its liberty were given expression in accounts of bloody triumph in the crucial founding epoch of its history. Origin legends did not always look back to primal acts of ethnic slaughter and displacement; but they did so often enough for the fact to be significant. 63 Brutus and his Trojans had driven out the giants whom they encountered on arrival in Britain, killing some, banishing others to remote, inhospitable regions. 64 When
Alexander the Great's disbanded Macedonian followers came into Germany, according to one thirteenth-century account they slaughtered all the inhabitants except for the peasantry, whose labours they planned to exploit. 65 The Scottish people, claimed the Declaration of Arbroath (1320), had gained its land 'having first driven out the Britons and altogether destroyed the Picts'. 66 The continental Saxons, according to their settlement myth, had won their land at the expense of Thuringians, who were there before them -again, partly through slaughter, partly by expelling the survivors. 67 The Saxon World Chronicle claimed that the River Oker, which flows through Braunschweig, had its name from Overkêr -crossing over: what the ancient Saxons compelled the Thuringians to do.
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The epic, sanguinary struggles of Dark-Age peoples, adumbrated in their origin legends, found corroboration in the fuller, more circumstantial accounts of early medieval historians like Gildas and Bede. 69 In Bede's Ecclesiastical History, the biblical template of divine destiny made manifest through ethnic destruction and replacement found authoritative expression, encapsulated in his portrait of King AEthelfrith:
For no ruler or king had subjected more land to the English people or settled it, having first either exterminated or conquered the natives. To him, in the character of Saul, could fittingly be applied the words which the patriarch said when he was blessing his son, 'Benjamin shall ravin as a wolf; in the morning he shall devour the prey and at night shall divide the spoil'.
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Underpinning the reading of accounts such as this was the commonplace, regularly repeated by medieval commentators, that the natural relationship between different peoples was enmity. 'As long as the world exists the German will never be brother to the Pole', a proverb insisted. 71 The British, claimed St Guthlac of Crowland's hagiographer, were 'the implacable enemies of the Saxon race'. 72 So ancient and deep-rooted was the mutual loathing of 'the German and Czech tongues', reflected one late medieval observer, that they could no more bear one another than Samaritan and Jew. 73 It was necessary only to project onto such primal visions of ethnic antagonism a narrative charting, like Bede's, the rightful ascent of God's chosen people, for it to become compellingly clear that separating sheep from goats, by all means necessary, was a pious task, serving the ends of divine providence. By the late Middle Ages, calls to do God's purifying work might be uttered not only from within the bosom of the Catholic Church but at its contested margins. The Czech reformer Jan Hus was alleged by a witness at his trial at Constance to have publicly declared, shortly after the enforced departure of German masters and students from the University of Prague (1409), that it was God who should be praised 'because we have got rid of the Germans'. 74 None of this is likely to persuade those who argue for the quintessential modernity of genocide to adjust their chronologies by a millennium or more. Nor, on the main point at issue, should it: the sheer magnitude of organised ethnic destruction in the modern world forbids hasty or facile comparisons. 75 The 'modernists', however, typically go further. The defining element of modern mass killing, they argue, lies in its systematic character, and thus its totality; qualities which, it is claimed, are inseparably bound up with the emergence of new forms of bureaucratic government in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 76 Some medievalists, of course, have for a long time been urging a different, altogether earlier, chronology for the 'modernisation' of European institutions and political culture. 'Let me state a certainty', James Campbell has written: 'Late Anglo-Saxon England was a nationstate'. 77 It is not necessary to share Campbell's certainty on the subject in order to agree that at least one act of late Old-English government -the St Brice's Day massacre -illdocumented though it is, appears chillingly redolent of the state-sponsored purges of more recent times. The Anglo-Saxon chronicle, despite its terseness, portrays the action both as comprehensive and as originating in royal command. 78 It is probably wise to treat sceptically Henry of Huntingdon's much later account, which depicts the king systematically dispatching secret letters to every town in his realm, ordering that the Danes be killed. 79 Yet it at least underlines how ambitious was Henry's own view of the capabilities of English royal government (and how sinister his notions of its means and ends), that he judged such a coordinated pogrom conceivable.
As the scope of royal government was extended in European kingdoms during the central and later Middle Ages, so also was its capacity forcibly to re-draw the ethnic map.
This growing potential found drastic expression in Frederick II's expulsion of the Muslim population from Sicily and their forced resettlement in the mainland town of Lucera. 80 More notorious examples of the same princely capability and will are the expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290 and the very much larger royally-sponsored purges of the Jewish populations of France and Spain in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 81 But royal power was not only being applied to simplify the map of peoples. Kings also acted to draw outsiders into their realms, in processes which brought their own tensions and conflicts. 'Hence may the English learn to call in foreigners, if they wish to be exiled by strangers', mused the Song of Lewes bitterly. 82 Demands that the aliens around the throne be sent packing became a familiar refrain, raised in diverse parts of Europe by aggrieved native elites and their spokespersons. 83 The happy example of earlier rulers might here be called upon to shame their descendants.
The Dalimil chronicle, compiled early in the fourteenth century and probably aimed at a Czech-speaking noble audience, thus recounted a number of edifying tales of princely xenophobia from times past. In one of these, a Bohemian duke had given 'the Germans' just three days to get out, the chronicler telling how one well-born member of that group, an abbess, was placed on a cart and unceremoniously dumped in the Bavarian forest. 84 From time to time, the clamour which such tales nurtured and reflected proved irresistible. A revolt among his nobles forced Duke Ziemomysl of Kuyavya (d. 1287) to withdraw property and privileges from the German knights whom he had invited to his court, and eventually to expel them altogether. 85 The king who surrounded himself with worthless foreigners while shunning his own loyal subjects was a well-established type for the tyrant. But the consequences of such arbitrary actions seemed to be magnified when they were coupled to the changes in social and economic life, and accompanying population movements, which Latin Europe witnessed between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. As a result of these, the foreigners who now entered some European kingdoms under the prince's protection no longer consisted only of small secular and clerical elites. 86 To contemporaries, the developments taking place could sometimes appear sinister and portentous in the extreme. Annals from Prague report under the year 1257 how the Bohemian king Otakar II (1253-78) -a notable patron of German immigration into his kingdom -'expelled the Bohemians from the suburb' beneath Prague castle, 'and settled aliens' there. 87 The rumour of Otakar's dark intentions grew, as was the natural tendency of such tales, in the decades after his death. According to one later chronicler, the king had promised his German protégés that he would give them the entire land of Bohemia to hold in perpetuity. 88 It became possible for hostile pamphleteers to portray such nightmare visions as imminent and fundamental threats to the ethnic identity, and thus the very existence, of the realm. Given the gravity of the alien menace, it was vital that the natives get their retaliation in first (a familiar refrain among modern ethnic cleansers too). 89 By the later Middle Ages, Czech polemicists are to be found urging that Bohemia's immigrant German populations be rooted out -like weeds from the garden, as one chronicler put it (and again, the metaphors of parasites and vermin repeatedly to be found in such writings seem disturbingly familiar ones). 90 The Hussite conflagration in the fifteenth century was to bring, in certain regions at least, a fulfilment of just such longings. . 92 Social change also had a part in facilitating such purges, penning up minorities within the walls of towns, and often within their own distinct neighbourhoods, where in time of disturbance they were easy prey for the aggrieved and the politically opportunistic alike. 93 In any case, as recent prominent instances ought to make clear, modern ethnic slaughter does not necessarily depend for its occurrence upon the governmental and technological resources usually associated with modernity: when popular moods and mentalities favour extreme action, the most basic means often suffice. 94 In its modes of thought and assumption, moreover, Latin Europe in the Middle Ages appears a rather less alien place than modern scholarship has often assumed it to be. The destruction of medieval peoples, it is true, was envisaged -whether with horror, glee, or the calm acceptance of assumed historical fact -far more frequently and characteristically than it was ever enacted. But envisaged it repeatedly was, and such imaginative acts themselves have much to disclose. Images of ethnic purge and replacement were written into the very DNA of medieval religious and political assumption. They supplied, to mix metaphors, a default mode for understanding certain kinds of political violence and upheaval. Whenever people found their essentially static, a-historical notions of community and identity challenged by social dynamism and political change, the spectre of ethnic destruction was able to do service both as a category of historical explanation and as a rallying cry in political struggles. Medieval people did not in every case envisage such destruction as genocidal, at least in post-twentiethcentury terms. Nevertheless, they did understand well a truth which their modern European descendants have repeatedly been forced to re-learn: that from stripping a people of its legal and political safeguards, to taking away its dignity, its property, and even the lives of its members, could prove on occasion to be perilously short and easy steps. 
